

# RATE DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO COMMUNITY SOLAR PROGRAMS

CSVP Workshop

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# SEMINAL TREATISES ON RATE DESIGN

- Bonbright, J. C. (1961): *Principles of Public Utility Rates*
- Garfield, P., & Lovejoy, W. (1964): *Public Utility Economics*
- Kahn, A. (1970): *The Economics of Regulation*

# UPDATED TAKES ON RATE DESIGN

- Bonbright, J. C. (1961): *Principles of Public Utility Rates*
- Garfield, P., & Lovejoy, W. (1964): *Public Utility Economics*
- Kahn, A. (1970): *The Economics of Regulation*
- Lazar, J., & Gonzalez, W. (2015): *Smart Rate Design for a Smart Future*
  - Available at: <http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/7680>
- NARUC Staff Subcommittee on Rate Design. (2016): *Distributed Energy Resources Rate Design and Compensation*
  - Available at: <https://www.naruc.org/rate-design/>

# ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (EXAMPLES FROM BONBRIGHT)

- Tariffs should keep the utility viable
  - Effectively yield the total revenue requirement and result in relatively stable cash flow and revenues from year to year
- Tariffs should fairly apportion the utility's cost of service among consumers
  - Should not unduly discriminate against any customer or group of customers.
- Tariffs should promote economic efficiency in the use of energy as well as competing products and services while ensuring the level of reliability desired by customers.

# ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES

## (EXAMPLES FROM LAZAR & GONZALEZ)

- Customers should be able to connect to the grid for no more than the cost of connecting to the grid
- Customers should pay for grid services and power supply based on how much and when they use grid services and power
- Customers who supply power to the grid should receive full and fair compensation for the power and grid services they supply – no more and no less

# EXAMPLE USING GARFIELD & LOVEJOY PRINCIPLES

Garfield and Lovejoy Criteria	CP Demand Charge	NCP Demand Charge	TOU Energy Charge
All customers should contribute to the recovery of capacity costs.	N	Y	Y
The longer the period of time the customer preempts (uses) the capacity, the more the customer should pay for the use of that capacity.	N	N	Y
Any service making exclusive use of capacity should be assigned 100% of the relevant costs.	Y	N	Y
The allocation of capacity costs should change gradually with changes in the pattern of usage.	N	N	Y
Allocation of costs to one class should be affected by how remaining costs are allocated to other classes.	N	N	Y
More demand costs should be allocated to usage on-peak than off-peak.	Y	N	Y
Users of interruptible service should be allocated less capacity costs, but still contribute something.	Y	N	Y


Source: Garfield and Lovejoy (1964), 163–164.



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# DECIDING WHICH CATEGORIES OF VALUE WILL BE CONSIDERED



Source: Rocky Mountain Institute, *A Review of Solar PV Benefit & Cost Studies*, 2013

# EXPANSIVE STUDY: COLORADO

<b>Benefit/(Cost)</b>	<b>Low Gas</b>	<b>Base Gas</b>	<b>High Gas</b>
	<b>\$/MWh</b>	<b>\$/MWh</b>	<b>\$/MWh</b>
<b>Avoided Energy Costs</b>	<b>35.80</b>	<b>52.10</b>	<b>76.10</b>
<b>Fuel Hedge Value</b>	<b>6.60</b>	<b>6.60</b>	<b>6.60</b>
<b>Avoided Emissions</b>	<b>27.40</b>	<b>27.40</b>	<b>27.40</b>
<b>Avoided Generation Capacity</b>	<b>50.60</b>	<b>50.60</b>	<b>50.60</b>
<b>Avoided Distribution</b>	<b>6.00</b>	<b>6.00</b>	<b>6.00</b>
<b>Avoided Transmission</b>	<b>18.00</b>	<b>18.00</b>	<b>18.00</b>
<b>Avoided Line Losses</b>	<b>4.70</b>	<b>6.20</b>	<b>8.30</b>
<b>(Solar Integration Costs)</b>	<b>(0.50)</b>	<b>(1.80)</b>	<b>(4.40)</b>
<b>+10% for Societal Benefits</b>	<b>14.90</b>	<b>16.50</b>	<b>18.90</b>
<b>Total Net Benefits/(Costs)</b>	<b>163.50</b>	<b>181.60</b>	<b>207.50</b>



# NON-ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES (EXAMPLES FROM BONBRIGHT)

- **Tariffs should be practical**
  - Simple, understandable, acceptable to the public, feasible to apply, and free from controversy as to their interpretation
- **Rates should be relatively stable**
  - Customers experience only minimal unexpected changes that are seriously adverse.

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# AWARDEES OF

